Philosophy has never made a lot of sense to me, and modern philosophy makes even less sense. For instance:
How to Resolve Doxastic Disagreement”, Synthese 191, 2359-81, 2014
by Anna-Maria Asunta Eder
How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer to the question of how to rationally revise one’s epistemic state in the light of disagreement.
Does anyone have the faintest idea of what these people are talking about?
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I think that Anna-Maria is discussing how a person might change her beliefs if those beliefs are inconsistent with a system of logic which the person herself accepts.
Don’t worry, the Emperor really is nekkid. We’re at a real low point in philosophy right now, with billows of pretentious, obscurantist verbosity being generated to cover the empty, nihilistic core of postmodernism and deconstructionism.